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By Richard  K  Abrams and C. Edward Harshbarger 
One  of  the  most  significant  economic 
developments in  agriculture during the  1970s 
has been the sharp expansion in international 
trade.  U.S.  agricultural  exports  have  shown 
remarkable  growth  in  recent  years,  as  the 
American farmer has been transformed into an 
international producer of food and fiber. At the 
same time, U.S.  consumers have continued to 
demand  the  agricultural  products  of  foreign 
countries and, as a result, agricultural imports 
have also grown rapidly. 
While agricultural  trade has expanded  very 
sharply during the past decade, it still remains 
below  levels  that  would  have  existed  in  the 
absence of  trade restrictions. Actions taken by 
governments to protect domestic industries and 
to provide for national security  by  supporting 
an  inefficient  agricultural  sector  reduce trade 
levels and distort  international  trade patterns. 
Obviously,  the economic goal  of  free trade  is 
not  universally accepted,  even  in  the  United 
States.  Nevertheless,  the  events  of  the  past 
decade  have  demonstrated  that  U. S. 
agriculture  has  become  inextricably  involved 
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with  the  international  market,  and  that  this 
involvement will likely increase in the future. 
This article  reviews  recent developments  in 
agricultural trade. Special attention is given to 
some of  the methods that are used  to distort 
trade patterns.  In addition, the agreements in 
the  recent  round  of  Multilateral  Trade 
Negotiations (MTN) are discussed in  terms of 
the implications for future trade expansion. 
U.S.  AGRICULTURAL 
TRADE DEVELOPMENTS 
In the last decade, U.S.  agricultural exports 
have more than  quadrupled, rising from  $6.7 
billion in fiscal 1970 to $27.3 billion  in  fiscal 
1978  (Table  1).  Since  1970,  exports  have 
increased more rapidly than production so that 
the proportion of  total  U.S.  farm: marketings 
that has been sold abroad has risen from 14 per 
cent to more than 25 per cent. Foreign markets 
now absorb the production from nearly one out 
of  every  three  harvested  acres.  Moreover, the 
U.S.  share  of  world  agricultural  trade  has 
increased from 13.5 per cent in 1970 to around 
17 per cent in  1978. 
The commodities largely responsible for the 
sharp gain in  the value of  agricultural exports 
in this decade are grains and soybeans.  Wheat 
and feed grains have each accounted for about 
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U.S.  AGRICULTURAL TRADE 
EXPORTS, IMPORTS, AND 
NET SURPLUS 
(Billion Dollars) 
F~scal  Year  Exports  Imports  Surplus 
1970  6.72  5.59  1.13 
197 1  7.76  5.83  1.93 
1972  8.05  6.05  2.00 
1973  12.90  7.32  5.58 
1974  2 1.32  9.55  1 1.77 
1975  21.58  9.58  12.00 
1976  22.76  10.1  1  1 2.65 
1977  24.00  1 3.38  10.62 
1978  27.30  13.89  13.4  1 
SOURCE:  U.S.  Department of Agriculture. 
25  per  cent  of  the  increase and soybeans for 
another 15 per cent of  the total gain. Over the 
last 25 years, the U.S.  portion of  world  grain 
exports has risen from about one-third of  the 
total to approximately one-half.'  In  addition, 
roughly 80 per cent of  the soybeans that enter 
world trade each year originate on U.S. farms. 
In fact, the United  States accounted for more 
than 80 per cent of  the total worldwide increase 
in grain exports during the 1970s. 
During the past decade,  the major markets 
for  U.S. farm  products  have  not  changed 
appreciably in  relative  importance  (Chart 1). 
The largest market is the European  Economic 
Community (EEC), which absorbs slightly more 
than  one-fourth  of  all  U.S.  agricultural 
exports.  On  the  other  hand,  Japan  is  the 
leading single country for U.S. farm products, 
purchasing about $4 billion in fiscal 1978, or 15 
per cent of  total sales abroad. The most signif- 
icant trade development in the 1970s has been 
the  growth  in  sales  to the  centrally  planned 
economies-Russia  and  China  in  particular. 
Starting from a negligible level, exports to these 
economies now  constitute about 10 per cent of 
total U.S. farm sales in foreign markets. 
The growth of  U.S. agricultural exports over 
the  past  decade  has  occurred  against  a 
background of  major  changes in  global trade 
patterns.  One  change  is  that  the  developed 
countries  have  been  increasing  their  relative 
share  of  agricultural  trade.  Also,  the 
less developed  countries and the centrally 
planned  economies  have  become  more 
dependent on the developed countries for food 
and  grain  imports,  and  intraregional  trade 
among  the  centrally  planned  economies  has 
been decreasing in  relative importan~e.~ 
A number of factors have contributed to the 
growth in  U.S.  agricultural exports during the 
1970s.  These factors  include occasional  world 
production shortfalls, decisions by foreign 
policymakers to  upgrade dietary standards  by 
importing more food, and the implementation 
of  programs designed  to  encourage economic 
development in less developed  countries.  Also, 
special  credit  programs  have  been  authorized 
by  Congress to assist foreign customers in the 
financing  of  agricultural  imports.  Although 
some  observers  believe  that  the  two 
devaluations  of  the  dollar,  along  with  the 
institution  of  floating  exchange  rates,  have 
stimulated  foreign  sales  in  recent  years,  the 
short-run impact of  these factors probably has 
been  small.3 Trade barriers and other  restric- 
tions have tended to negate the positive effects 
of  changes in currency exchange rates.  Thus, 
1 S.C. Schmidt, H.D. Guither, and A.B. Mackie, "Quanti-  Ibid,  P- 76. 
tative  Dimensions  of  Agricultural  Trade,"  Speaking  of  3 William E. Kost, "Effects of an Exchange Rate Change 
Trade: Its  Effect  on  Agriculture.  Agricultural  Extension  on Agricultural Trade," Agricultural Economics Ratearch, 
Service, University of Minnesota, Special  Report  No.  72,  U.S. Department  of  Agriculture, Vol.  28,  No.  3,  July 
November 1978, pp. 78-9.  1976, p. 99. 
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foreign  demand for agricultural  products  has 
not been very sensitive to price changes because 
of trade impediments. 
The growth of agricultural exports during the 
1970s has been accompanied by large increases 
in  agricultural  imports.  U.S.  imports  have 
more than doubled, going from $5.6  billion in 
fiscal 1970 to almost $14 billion in fiscal 1978. 
A large share of this increase is due to the rapid 
growth  in  complementary  imports,  i. e., 
products that are not produced in the United 
States. For example, coffee imports amounted 
to nearly $4 billion in fiscal 1977, or almost 30 
per cent of  total agricultural irnport~.~  Signifi- 
cant quantities of crude rubber, cocoa  beans, 
and  spices  are  also  purchased  from  foreign 
sellers each year. Although the relative share of 
complementary  imports  to  total  agricultural 
Agricultural Statistics. U.S.  Department of  Agriculture, 
1978, p. 573. 
imports  has  trended  down  over  time,  the 
experience in  recent years  has  been  quite  the 
opposite. Since 1975, when this proportion fell 
to 29  per  cent,  complementary  imports  have 
expanded very rapidly, pushing the ratio up to 
47 per cent in fiscal 1978. 
As  the  growth  of  agricultural  exports  has 
exceeded  the growth  in  imports,  the  surplus 
from  agricultural trade has grown sharply.  In 
the past decade, the surplus has advanced from 
just over  $1 billion to almost  $13.5  billion  in 
fiscal 1978.  The large surplus  in  agricultural 
trade has helped alleviate the serious balance of 
payments  problem faced  by  the United  States 
in recent years. 
OBSTACLES TO ACHIEVING 
TRADE POTENTIAL 
The growth in agricultural  trade during the 
1970s  has  produced  many  benefits.  Not  only 
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enhanced  by  this development,  but the world 
has been  brought  much  closer  together,  both 
economically and  politically.  Living  standards 
have been substantially increased  in the devel- 
oped world as a result of trade, and conditions 
in  the developing world  are also  beginning to 
show  some  improvement.  However,  there  is 
room  for  a  further  expansion  in  agricultural 
trade, particularly if various trade barriers can 
be relaxed. 
Although  the  potential  benefits  from 
international trade are well documented, most 
countries are unwilling to open their borders to 
free trade flows.  This reluctance  is  especially 
acute for agricultural products. Because of this 
anti-trade  bias,  many  countries  end  up 
producing  goods that can  be  produced  more 
efficiently else~here.~  As  a  result, total world 
output is kept below its maximum potential. 
Although inefficient industries are protected 
for many reasons, four arguments are frequent- 
ly  used to justify barriers in agricultural trade. 
First,  it  is  often  claimed  that  domestic. sup- 
plies  of  agricultural  products  are  vital  to 
national  security  and  therefore  the  domestic 
agricultural sector must be protected, indepen- 
dent  of  its  relative  inefficiency.  The  second 
argument  states  that  domestic  agricultural 
5 Nations trade for the same reasons that regions or people 
do-to  gain  from  the  benefits  of  specialization.  These 
benefits can arise in two ways. Fist, two identical countries 
can  profit by  arbitrarily specializing in  different goods in 
order  to  exploit economies  of  scale.  Second,  and  more 
important,  potential  benefits  from  trade  exist  because 
countries, like people, are not equally endowed in all ways. 
Some countries are  densely populated, others have  fertile 
land or  extensive water  resources,  while  others have  vast 
quantities of capital  or  a skilled work  force. In  fact,  any 
difference can make a country relatively better at producing 
some set of goods, and this comparative  advantage  is the 
basis  for  international  trade.  For  a  more  complete 
description  of  comparative  advantage  and  the  potential 
benefits of trade, see C.P. Kindleberger and P.H.  Lindert, 
International  Economics  (Homewood,  Ill.  :  Richard  D. 
Irwin, Inc., 1978), pp. 15-35, 489-95. 
production  must  be  protected  because  foreign 
suppliers  are  unreliable.  The  U.S.  embargo 
on  soybean  exports  in  1973  lends  some 
credence to this claim.  Third, some countries 
maintain  that  protection  is  necessary  to 
insure  farmers  a  fair  standard  of  living. 
Thus, prices are supported at high levels and 
foreign  competition  is  controlled  by  imposing 
trade restrictions.  Finally, some countries 
believe  that  protection  of  their  agricultural 
sector  is  an  inexpensive  way  of  avoiding 
unemployment.  This  belief  is  based  on  the 
presumption that freer agricultural trade would 
release  more  workers  from  the  agricultural 
sector  than could  be  absorbed  by  the  other 
sectors of  the economy.  Whatever the reasons, 
many countries want to be self sufficient in the 
production  of  food,  and  so long  as  this  goal 
exists,  trade barriers will  be  difficult  to 
eliminate. 
Numerous  methods  are  used  to  protect 
domestic  agricultural  sectors  and  to  distort 
agricultural  trade  patterns.  In  some  cases, 
trade  is  restricted  by  raising  the  price  of 
imports directly by imposing tariffs or variable 
levies. In others, the supply of foreign products 
is  limited  directly  with  quotas,  or  indirectly 
with other nontariff barriers. 
Tariffs 
Many countries  protect  domestic  producers 
by taxing imports. One form of tax is the tariff, 
which  charges  importers  for  each  unit  of  a 
commodity imported into the country.  Because 
of the tariff, the product will only be imported 
when  the  domestic  price  is  greater  than  the 
world  price  plus  the  tariff.  Although  tariffs 
have  historically  been  a  most  important 
impediment  to  agricultural  trade,  their 
relative  importance  has  declined  in  recent 
years.  More  recently,  variable  levies,  quotas, 
and other  nontariff  barriers have  become  the 
most  common  methods  of  restricting 
Federal Reserve Bank  of  Kansas City agricultural  exports.  Nevertheless,  virtually 
every country continues to use tariffs to restrict 
agricultural imports. 
Two types of tariffs are commonly used-the 
specific and the ad valorem.  The specific tariff 
places  a  fixed  charge  per  unit  imported, 
independent of its price. Therefore, if the world 
price rises  relative  to the domestic  price,  the 
degree  of  protection  afforded  by  the  tariff 
declines6  The ad valorem tariff, on the other 
hand,  taxes  the  imported  good  by  a  fixed 
percentage of its price.  Thus, if  import prices 
rise, the degree of protection is unchanged, but 
the tax per unit increases.  Historically,  specific 
tariffs have been common, but in  recent years, 
probably as a  result  of  inflation,  ad  valorem 
tariffs have been favored .' 
An  example  of  a  tariff  on  agricultural 
imports by the United States is the 20  per cent 
ad  valorem  tariff  on  hard  Italian-type 
cheeses.'  Because of this tariff, these cheeses 
cannot be profitably imported  into the United 
States if  the domestic price is less than 20 per 
cent  above  the  world  price.  In  the  event 
American  producers can  satisfy domestic 
demand  below  this  price,  the  tariff  will  be 
prohibitive  and  these  cheeses  will  not  be 
imported, except  those  which  the public  may 
regard  as  specialty  products.  However,  since 
U.S. producers, even with tariff protection, are 
not  competitive  with  Argentina,  the  primary 
The  degree  of  protection,  or  the  tariff  rate,  is  the 
percentage increase in the price of the imported good as a 
result of the tariff.  It  measures the amount of protection 
domestic producers receive as a per cent of the cost of the 
good. 
To see how effective inflation is at reducing the degree of 
protection provided by a specific tariff, one need only note 
that  the  protection  provided  by  the  U.S.  Smoot-Hawley 
Tariff of 1930 declined from 47 per cent in 1934 to 24.4 per 
cent in 1945 as a result of inflation. 
8 The  U.S. also  has  a  quota  on  these  cheeses  which  is 
generally binding. As part of the MTN's, the United States 
reduced the tariff 5 per cent. 
exporter  of  these  cheeses,  hard  Italian-type 
cheeses are normally sold in the United  States 
at 20 per cent above the world price. 
As  a  result  of  tariffs  on  agricultural 
products,  a  country's  government  and  its 
farmers benefit  at the expense  of  consumers. 
The farmers  benefit  because the tariff  allows 
them to sell their products above world  prices. 
Thus, producers who would be inefficient in the 
world market may be able to make profits with 
the tariff,  while  domestic  producers  who  are 
internationally  competitive  make inflated 
profits from domestic sales as a  result  of  the 
tariff  protection.  The  government  also  gains 
because it receives a tax on the iinported goods. 
The loser from the tariff is the consumer. Since 
the  tariff  raises  the  price  of  agricultural 
products, less is  consumed  at a  higher  price. 
Still,  the  country  as  a  whole  loses  because 
benefits to government from the tariff revenue 
and  to  the  producers  from  higher  sales  at 
higher prices are inadequate to compensate the 
consumers for value they  would  have  realized 
by consuming more agricultural products at the 
world price. 
Variable Levies 
Another  technique  used  to  restrict 
agricultural  trade  is  the  variable  levy.  This 
technique,  used  exclusively  by  the  EEC, 
prevents agricultural imports from under- 
pricing domestic  suppliers.1° To  keep  foreign 
imports  noncompetitive,  the  EEC  has  set 
minimum  import  prices  on  two-thirds  of  its 
agricultural  products,  including  grains,  rice, 
dairy products, beef, pork, poultry, eggs, olive 
9 See  H. Robert  Heller, International Trade:  Theory and 
Empirical Evidence (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 
Inc., 1973), pp. 164-7. 
10 For  a further discussion of the  EEC variable levy,  see 
R.B. Schroeter and Omero Sabatini, "The EC's CAP: How 
It Works," Foreign Agriculture. January 9, 1978, pp. 2-5. 
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The  minimum  import  price  is  the  EEC's 
desired  wholesale  price  in  the  Community's 
highest  priced  market for  the  given  product, 
less transport costs. Variable levies are set daily 
at a level which will ensure that the price of the 
imported  products  when  delivered  to the 
highest  priced market area in the EEC is  not 
below the threshold  price, which is  the EEC's 
desired wholesale price in that market. 
For  example,  on  December  12,  1978,  the 
EEC's  minimum import  price for  No.  2 hard 
winter  wheat  was  $282  per  metric  ton  (mt), 
delivered in Rotterdam. At that price, the EEC 
was  assured  that  imported  grain,  when 
delivered  in  Duisburg,  Germany-the  EEC's 
highest  priced  grain  market-would  not  be 
below the Duisburg threshold  price.  Since the 
wheat  was  selling  for  $122  that  day,  the 
variable levy was set  as $160  per  mt. Because 
this  type  of  levy  guarantees  that  Community 
producers  cannot  be  undersold,  foreign 
producers  are forced  to become  residual 
suppliers who are only able to supply quantities 
and  qualities  that  cannot  be  produced 
domestically. 
When  EEC  grain  prices  fall  to  the 
intervention  price,  which  is  a  little  below the 
threshold  price  less  transport  costs  to 
Duisburg, the EEC will  prohibit  imports  and 
buy the excess domestic  grain off  the market. 
To avoid this problem, the EEC often uses the 
proceeds from  the variable  levies  to subsidize 
agricultural  exports.  This  allows  exporters  to 
sell  the EEC's  excess supplies  at  competitive 
world prices in non-EEC markets. 
Quotas 
Instead  of  taxing  imports,  many  countries 
choose  to  limit  import  volume  directly. 
Quantitative  restrictions  are called  quotas.  A 
quota  reduces  imports  and  raises  domestic 
prices if  domestic supplies  plus the quota  do 
not satisfy domestic demand at the world price. 
In recent years,  quotas have become a very 
common  method  of  restricting  agricultural 
trade. The United States, Japan, and the EEC 
all  presently  are  using  quotas.  A  striking 
example  is  the Japanese quota on "hotel," or 
high  quality  beef,  which  limited  the importa- 
tion of such beef into Japan to 16,800 tons in 
1978.  Since  Japanese  beef  production  is  not 
competitive at world  prices and the quota was 
binding, the price of hotel quality beef was bid 
up to clear the market. As a result, in January, 
comparable cuts of  beef  were  61/2  times  more 
expensive in Tokyo than in Washington ($18.69  ' 
per lb. versus $2.89). 
When  a  quota  is  binding,  permission  to 
import a unit of the protected item is valued by 
the importer at the difference between the do- 
mestic  and  the  world  price.  As  a  result, 
governments often collect tariff-like revenues by 
auctioning import licenses to the  highest 
bidder.  If  exchange  rates  or  world  prices 
fluctuate,  the  value  of  an  import  license 
fluctuates  in  a  way  opposite  from  an  ad 
valorem tariff.  If  the world  price rises relative 
to the domestic  price,  the value  of  a  license 
declines relative to the price of  the good, and 
the degree of protection declines. 
Other Nontariff Barriers 
Tariffs,  variable  levies, and  quotas are the 
most  visible ways  to discriminate against 
imports,  but  they  are  not  the  only  ways. 
Virtually  every  country  has  laws,  standards, 
and regulations which intentionally or uninten- 
tionally discriminate against foreign goods." 
l1  "World Food Prices," Foreign Agriculture, February 5, 
1979, pp. 6-7. 
12 For a list of the types of nontariff bamers by  country, 
see  Jimmye  S.  Hillman,  Nontarfl  Agricultural  Trade 
Barriers  (Lincoln,  Neb.:  University  of  Nebraska  Press, 
1978), pp. 57-60, 62-3. 
Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City Of  the  many  nontariff  barriers,  those  which 
probably  have  the  greatest  impact  on 
agricultural  trade are health  regulations, 
bureaucratic rules, and labeling requirements. 
Health regulations  are  normally  created  to 
assure that food  is  suitable for  consumption; 
however, these regulations are sometimes used 
to restrict imports. One common practice is to 
forbid importation of a foreign product because 
of  an isolated problem with a disease or a pest, 
even  though  the  probability  of  domestic 
contagion is  extremely small.  In  other  cases, 
countries  will  not  allow  the  importation  of 
certain agricultural products because a certain 
insecticide or preservative is used, even though 
it  has not been  proven  to  be dangerous.  The 
United  States,  Japan,  and  the  EEC  have  all 
been  suspected  of  manipulating  apparently 
legitimate health regulations to form formidible 
barriers  to  trade  in  certain  agricultural 
products.  Health  regulations  have  also  been 
used  selectively  to restrict  imports  based  on 
market conditions in  the importing country." 
This  procedure involves  loose  enforcement of 
health regulations when domestic supplies are 
inadequate,  and  stringent  enforcement  when 
supplies are ample. 
Two  other  methods  of  deterring  foreign 
exporters are the use of  extensive bureaucratic 
rules  and  labeling  requirements.  These  rules 
and requirements vary  between  countries and 
act  to  increase  the  time,  cost,  and 
inconvenience  involved  in  penetrating  a 
country's  markets.  As  a  result,  producers 
sometimes avoid  exporting to a  given  country 
simply  because  the  cost,  in  terms  of 
inconvenience, is viewed as being too great. 
13 Iimmye S. Hiillman, "Nontariff Barriers: Major Problem 
in  Agricultural Trade," American Journal of  Agricultural 
Economics. August 1978, p. 493, and Gerard and Victoria 
Curzon, Hidden Barriers to International Trade,  Thames 
Essay  No.  1,  Trade  Policy  Research  Center  (London: 
Ditchling Press, 1970), pp. 26-33. 
EXPANDING TRADE THROUGH 
MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS 
The development  of  trade  between  the 
United States and its trading partners has been 
a difficult task. While the benefits of free trade 
are widely recognized, many attacks have been 
launched against this ideal over  the years.  In 
fact, the United  States has frequently utilized 
various trade restrictive practices in an effort to 
protect certain  industries,  overcome economic 
recessions,  and  retaliate  against  unfair  trade 
practices of foreign countries. 
The height of  protectionism was  attained in 
1930 when Congress passed the Smoot-Hawley 
Tariff in an effort to counteract the economic 
downturn of the late 1920s. Unfortunately, this 
action caused many trading nations to increase 
their own  levels of  protection and, as a  result, 
U.S.  exports suffered catastrophic  declines in 
the years that followed. Since then, the United 
States  has devoted  most  of  its efforts  toward 
trade  liberalization,  but  meaningful  progress 
has been slow. 
While some progress was made on a bilateral 
basis during the 1930s, the real thrust toward 
reducing tariffs and  other  trade  impediments 
started when the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (GATT) was formed in 1947.  Unlike 
earlier  agreements  and  treaties,  the  results 
from the GATT negotiations were made multi- 
lateral  in  scope  in  that  the  agreed  upon 
concessions  were  extended  to  all  members 
under  a  "most-favored  nation"  clausethe 
cornerstone of GATT. 
GATT  is  predicated  on  two  basic  princi- 
ples." One is that each nation shall grant non- 
discriminatory treatment to the products of  all 
other  participating  nations  with  regard  to 
l4  Robert L. Fontz, "Foreign Agricultural Trade Policy of 
the  United  States,  1776-1976,"  U.S.  Department  of 
Agriculture, ERS-662, January 1977, p.12. 
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is  that,  as  a  general  practice,  quantitative 
restrictions  (quotas) are  not  to  be  used 
as  protective  devices.  Only  customs  duties 
can  be used  for this  purpose.  However,  these 
guiding  principles  have  occasionally  posed 
some  policy  dilemmas for  the  United  States. 
For example, the President has the authority to 
negotiate tariff reductions with  other  nations, 
but his powers have frequently been limited by 
Congress, particularly when there was  concern 
about  possible  injury  to  domestic  industries. 
Also,  the farm  legislation  that  was  in  effect 
during the early years of  GATT offered strong 
inducements  to foreign  countries to ship 
agricultural  products  to  the  United  States, 
where  prices  were  artificially  high  because  of 
the support  mechanism. Thus,  to protect the 
integrity of the domestic support programs, the 
United  States  resorted  to  the  use  of  import 
quotas-a practice clearly inconsistent with the 
objectives  of  GATT.  Because  of  this  policy 
conflict,  a  GATT  waiver  on  quotas  was 
eventually granted for agricultural trade. 
Seven  rounds  of  Multilateral  Trade 
Negotiations have  now  been  completed  since 
the  inception  of  GATT.  As  a  result  of  these 
negotiations,  tariffs  have  been  reduced  or 
eliminated  on  a  number  of  products,  and 
strong efforts have  also  been  made to reduce 
the  proliferation  of  nontariff  barriers. 
Unfortunately,  the  agricultural  sector  of  the 
economy has not been the recipient of  many of 
these  gains.  Reducing  trade  barriers  on 
agricultural products is much more difficult to 
achieve because most countries are unwilling to 
make significant concessions on  a multilateral 
basis. 
In the Tokyo  Round  of  the  MTN's,  which 
began in  1973 and concluded  in  mid-April of 
this year, the United States insisted on treating 
agriculture as  a  part of  the  total  negotiation 
package  rather  than  as  a  separate  issue. 
Consequently,  the  discussions  focused  much 
more sharply on agricultural trade restrictions 
than  in  any  of  the  previous  rounds.  Several 
agreements  have  been  reached.  The  new 
"codes," if  approved,  will  impose  stiffer 
restrictions on the use of export subsidies. Also, 
many of  the nontariff  barriers, including 
import  quotas,  favoritism  toward  some 
exporters at the expense of others, unfair use of 
sanitation rules, and a variety of  other devices 
designed  to  stifle  competition,  will  be 
reduced. 
As  it now  stands, trade barriers against U.S. 
farm  exports  will  be  reduced  on  about  $3 
billion of products. In return, the United States 
will grant concessions on about $700 million of 
imported farm  products,  mostly  in  the  dairy 
industry.  Japan  appears  to  have  offered  the 
United  States  the  largest  package  of  trade 
concessions,  involving  larger  quotas  for 
oranges,  hotel  quality  beef,  and  certain  fruit 
concentrates. In addition, the EEC is granting 
important concessions on  tobacco,  rice, fruit, 
and beef.  Concessions have also been  received 
from other trading partners. 
While positive progress has apparently been 
made in  the Tokyo Round,  negotiations on  a 
new  International Wheat Agreement  have 
collapsed.  This  issue  became  deadlocked  for 
several  reasons.  Several  countries  were 
interested in establishing an international grain 
reserve, but agreement could not be reached on 
the size of the reserve or the relative share that 
each  country  would  hold.  Also,  the  specific 
prices  at which  grain  reserves  would  be 
accumulated or  released  could  not  be  agreed 
upon, and an accord on the special provisions 
for developing countries proved  to be  another 
Much  attention  has  been  paid  to  reducing  barriers 
which  result  from  restrictive  procurement  policies  by 
governments  and  government  agencies,  as  well  as  from 
nonstandard customs  valuation  methods.  However,  any 
liberalization in these areas should have little or no effect 
on agricultural trade. 
Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City stumbling  block.  The  failure  of  these  talks 
highlights  the  continuing  frustrations  exper- 
ienced  by  any  group  trying  to  reduce  trade 
barriers. 
CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
On the surface,  the  potential  demand  for 
U.S.  agricultural products appears to be 
unlimited.  Much  of  the world's  population  is 
malnourished  and  badly  needs  to  upgrade 
dietary  standards.  Also,  now  that  diplomatic 
relations  have  been  established  with  the 
People's Republic of China, a potentially huge 
market  comprising  about  one-fourth  of  the 
world's  population, will  be open  to the  U.S. 
farmer. However, translating potential demand 
for  food  into effective demand  will  remain  a 
difficult task, either because incomes are so low 
in  many  countries  or  because  the  barriers  to 
agricultural trade are so high. 
Still,  the  United  States  should  continue  to 
encourage  a  worldwide  policy  of  agricultural 
trade  expansion.  The  large  trade  surpluses 
which the United States has enjoyed in  recent 
years  would  likely  experience  further  growth 
under  conditions  of  freer  trade.  This 
development  would  be  highly  beneficial  to 
America.  A positive agricultural trade balance 
would not only act to ease the burden of paying 
for  petroleum  imports  at  ever-rising  price 
levels,  it  would  also  tend  to  strengthen  the 
international  buying  power  of  the  dollar.  A 
smaller  trade  deficit  with  a  stronger  dollar 
would  allow  U.S.  consumers  to  continue  to 
import  the foreign  goods  that  are  associated 
with a high standard of living. 
Although  the  negotiated  agreements 
provided by the MTN's have not been large, the 
discussions  provide  hope for  an expansion  of 
agricultural  trade in  the future.  Certainly,  a 
growing world population and rising incomes in 
the  developing  countries  augur  well  for  the 
U.S.  farmer.  But if  the trends established  in 
the 1970s are to continue, more progress must 
be  made  in  the  relaxation  of  trade barriers. 
Unfortunately, history shows that the efforts to 
further  liberalize  trade will  probably  proceed 
slowly,  and  then  only  with  difficult  negotia- 
tions. 
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